




































zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
IZA Policy Paper No. 18











University of Cologne and IZA 
 
Clemens Fuest 
University of Oxford, 
University of Cologne, CESifo and IZA 
 
Andreas Peichl 














P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  









The IZA Policy Paper Series publishes work by IZA staff and network members with immediate 
relevance for policymakers. Any opinions and views on policy expressed are those of the author(s) 
and not necessarily those of IZA. 
 
The papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of 
such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly 














Social Protection as an Automatic Stabilizer
* 
 
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of social protection systems in Europe and the US to 
provide (income) insurance against macro level shocks in terms of automatic stabilizers. We 
find that automatic stabilizers absorb 38% of a proportional income shock and 47% of an 
idiosyncratic unemployment shock in Europe, compared to 32% and 34% in the US. There is 
large heterogeneity within Europe with stabilization being much lower in Eastern and 
Southern than in Central and Northern Europe. Our results suggest that social transfers, in 
particular the rather generous systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role 
for the stabilization of disposable incomes and explain a large part of the difference in 
automatic stabilizers between Europe and the US. 
 
JEL Classification:  E32, E63, H2, H31 
  







P.O. Box 7240  
53072 Bonn  
Germany 




             
                                                 
* Paper prepared for the EU Presidency Joint Conference ‘Assuring Adequate Pensions & Social 
Benefits for All European Citizens’, Liège, September 7-8, 2010.  
1  Introduction 
Throughout Europe, the current economic and financial crisis has had a severe impact 
on incomes and employment. In 2009 worldwide output fell by 0.9%, with a drop by 
2.4% in the United States and 4.2% in the EU1. Both the magnitude of this economic 
contraction as well as its effects on labor markets, disposable household incomes and 
private consumption have been attenuated considerably by the work of automatic stabi-
lization. Automatic stabilizers are usually defined as those elements of fiscal policy 
which mitigate output fluctuations without discretionary government action (see, e.g., 
Eaton and Rosen (1980)). During the current crisis, the tax and benefit system has been 
acting as an automatic stabilizer on both the revenue side as well as the expenditure 
side of the general government budget and the social security system in particular. 
Despite the importance of automatic stabilizers for stabilizing the economy, “very little 
work has been done on automatic stabilization [...] in the last 20 years” (Blanchard (2006)). 
However, especially in the current crisis, it is important to assess the contribution of 
automatic stabilizers to overall fiscal expansion and to compare their magnitude across 
countries. Previous research on automatic stabilization has mainly relied on macro data. 
Exceptions based on micro data are Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) for the US and Mab-
bett and Schelkle (2007) for the EU-15.  
In this policy paper, we report the results from a comprehensive comparison of the 
magnitude and composition of automatic stabilization between the US and Europe 
based on micro data estimates and discuss the implications for social policy.2 In Dolls, 
Fuest and Peichl (2010a, 2010b), we analyze the impact of automatic stabilizers using 
microsimulation models for 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM). 
The microsimulation approach allows us to investigate the causal effects of different 
types of shocks on household disposable income; holding everything else constant and 
therefore avoiding endogeneity problems (see Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)). We 
can hence single out the role of automatic stabilization which is not possible in an ex-
post evaluation (or with macro data) as it is not possible to disentangle the effects of 
automatic stabilizers, active fiscal and monetary policy and behavioral responses like 
changes in labor supply or disability benefit take-up. 
We run two controlled experiments of macro shocks to income and employment. The 
first is a proportional decline in household gross income by 5% (income shock). This is 
the usual way of modeling shocks in simulation studies analyzing automatic stabilizers. 
However, economic downturns typically affect households asymmetrically, with some 
households losing their jobs and suffering a sharp decline in income and other house-
holds being much less affected, as wages are usually rigid in the short term. We there-
fore consider a second macro shock where some households become unemployed, so 
that the unemployment rate increases such that total household income decreases by 
                                                           
1 Data from the European Commission’s Spring 2010 Economic Forecast. 
2 The results used in this paper are based on Dolls et al. (2010a, 2010b). 
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5% (unemployment shock). We show that these two types of shocks and the resulting 
stabilization coefficients can be interpreted as an average effective marginal tax rate 
(EMTR) for the whole tax benefit system at the intensive (proportional income shock) or 
extensive (unemployment shock) margin.  
2  Theoretical framework 
Economic stabilization is primarily associated with the ability of taxes and transfers to 
stabilize income and in consequence consumption automatically in the face of economic 
downturns. The stabilizing character of the tax and transfer system relies on a simple 
mechanism: In the presence of a negative shock to income, taxes should react more than 
proportionately so that disposable income is affected less than proportionally by the 
downturn. Several components of government budgets are impacted by the macroeco-
nomic situation in ways that operate to smooth the business cycle, with progressive in-
come taxes and unemployment benefits being the most prominent example. Automatic 
stabilization might have effects not only on disposable income but also on GDP itself. If 
in a recession fewer taxes are collected and more transfers are paid, this should support 
private incomes and damp adverse movements in aggregate demand. We can expect 
this stabilizing property to be stronger if the tax system is more progressive (van den 
Noord, 2000).  
The extent to which automatic stabilizers mitigate the impact of income shocks on 
household demand essentially depends on two factors. Firstly, the tax and transfer sys-
tem determines the way in which a given shock to gross income translates into a change 
in disposable income. For instance, in the presence of a proportional income tax with a 
tax rate of 40%, a shock on gross income of one hundred Euros leads to a decline in dis-
posable income of 60 Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs 40% of the shock to gross in-
come. A progressive tax, in turn, would have a stronger stabilizing effect. The second 
factor is the link between current disposable income and current demand for goods and 
services. If the income shock is perceived as transitory and current demand depends on 
some concept of permanent income, and if households can borrow or use accumulated 
savings, their demand will not change. In this case, the impact of automatic stabilizers 
on current demand would be equal to zero. Things are different, though, if households 
are liquidity constrained. In this case, their current expenditures do depend on dispos-
able income so that automatic stabilizers play a role. However, in this chapter, we will 
concentrate on the first factor, the stabilization of disposable income after shocks on 
gross income. 
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization is the “normalized tax change” 
used by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be interpreted as “the tax system’s 
built-in flexibility” (Pechman (1973, 1987)). Based on this idea, in Dolls et al. (2010a), we 
define the “income stabilization coefficient” which shows how changes in market income 
translate into changes in disposable income through changes in personal income tax 
payments. We extend the concept of normalized tax change to include other taxes as 
well as social insurance contributions and transfers like e.g. unemployment benefits. 
We take into account personal income taxes (at all government levels), social insurance 
contributions as well as payroll taxes and transfers to private households such as un-
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employment benefits.3 Computations are done according to the tax benefit rules which 
were in force before 2008 in order to avoid an endogeneity problem resulting from pol-
icy responses after the start of the crisis. 
3  Microsimulation using TAXSIM and EUROMOD 
We use microsimulation techniques to simulate taxes, benefits and disposable income 
under different scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households. Simula-
tion analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing the parameters of 
interest while holding everything else constant (cf. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)). 
We therefore do not have to deal with endogeneity problems when identifying the ef-
fects of the policy reform under consideration. 
Simulations are carried out using TAXSIM - the NBER's microsimulation model for cal-
culating liabilities under US Federal and State income tax laws from individual data - 
and EUROMOD, a static tax-benefit model for 19 EU countries, which was designed for 
comparative analysis.4 The models can simulate most direct taxes and benefits except 
those based on previous contributions as this information is usually not available from 
the cross-sectional survey data used as input datasets. Information on these instruments 
is taken directly from the original data sources. Both models assume full benefit take-up 
and tax compliance, focusing on the intended effects of tax-benefit systems. The main 
stages of the simulations are the following. First, a micro-data sample and tax-benefit 
rules are read into the model. Then for each tax and benefit instrument, the model con-
structs corresponding assessment units, ascertains which are eligible for that instrument 
and determines the amount of benefit or tax liability for each member of the unit. Fi-
nally, after all taxes and benefits in question are simulated, disposable income is calcu-
lated. 
4  Scenarios 
The existing literature on stabilization so far has concentrated on increases in earnings 
or gross incomes to examine the stabilizing impact of tax benefit systems. In the light of 
the current economic crisis, there is much more interest in a downturn scenario. Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2009) stress that recessions which follow a financial crisis have particu-
larly severe effects on asset prices, output and unemployment. Therefore, we are inter-
ested not only in a scenario of a uniform decrease in incomes but also in an increase of 
                                                           
3We abstract from other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes. For an analysis of automatic stabiliz-
ers in the corporate tax system, see Devereux and Fuest (2009) and Buettner and Fuest (forthcoming). 
4For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit 
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/. For further information on EUROMOD see Sutherland (2001, 2007). 
There are also country reports available with detailed information on the input data, the modeling and 
validation of each tax benefit system, see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. The tax-
benefit systems included in the model have been validated against aggregated administrative statistics as 
well as national tax-benefit models (where available), and the robustness checked through numerous 
applications (see, e.g., Bargain (2006)). 
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the unemployment rate. We compare a scenario where gross incomes are proportion-
ally decreased by 5% for all households (income shock) to a scenario where some 
households are made unemployed and therefore lose all their labor earnings (unem-
ployment shock). In the latter scenario, the unemployment rate increases such that total 
household income decreases by 5% as well in order to make both scenarios as compara-
ble as possible.5 
The increase of the unemployment rate is modeled through reweighting of our sam-
ples.6 The weights of the unemployed are increased while those of the employed with 
similar characteristics are decreased, i.e., in effect, a fraction of employed households is 
made unemployed. With this reweighting approach we control for several individual 
and household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unemployed. The 
implicit assumption behind this approach is that the socio-demographic characteristics 
of the unemployed remain constant.7 
5  Empirical Results 
We start our analysis by comparing the US to Europe. Our simulation model includes 
19 European countries which we treat as one single country (i.e. the “United States of 
Europe”). All of them are EU Member States, which is why we refer to this group as the 
EU, bearing in mind that some EU member countries are missing. We also consider the 
countries of the Euro area and refer to this group as 'Euro'. Figure 1 summarizes the 
results of our baseline simulation, which focuses on the income tax, social insurance 
contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by employees and benefits. Consider first the in-
come shock. Approximately 38% of such a shock would be absorbed by automatic stabi-
                                                           
5Our scenarios can be seen as a conservative estimate of the expected impact of the current crisis (see 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for effects of previous crises). The (qualitative) results are robust with respect 
to different sizes of the shocks. The results for the unemployment shock do not change much when we 
model it as an increase of the unemployment rate by 5 percentage points for each country. It would be 
further possible to derive more complicated scenarios with different shocks on different income sources 
or a combination of income and unemployment shock. However, this would only have an impact on the 
distribution of changes which are not relevant in the analysis of this chapter. Therefore, we focus on these 
two simple scenarios in order to make our analysis as simple as possible. One should note, though, that 
our analysis is not a forecasting exercise. We do not aim at quantifying the exact effects of the current 
economic crisis but of stylized scenarios in order to explore the build-in automatic stabilizers of existing 
pre-crisis tax-benefit systems. Conducting an ex-post analysis would include discretionary government 
reactions and behavioral responses (see, e.g., Aaberge et al. (2000) for an empirical ex-post analysis of a 
previous crisis in the Nordic countries) and we would not be able to identify the role of automatic stabili-
zation. 
6For the reweighting procedure, we follow the approach of Immervoll et al. (2006), who have also simu-
lated an increase in unemployment through reweighting of the sample. Their analysis focuses on changes 
in absolute and relative poverty rates after changes in the income distribution and the employment rate. 
7Cf. Deville and Saerndal (1992) and DiNardo et al. (1996). This approach is equivalent to estimating 
probabilities of becoming unemployed (see, e.g., Bell and Blanchflower (2009)) and then selecting the 
individuals with the highest probabilities when controlling for the same characteristics in the reweighting 
estimation (see Herault (2009)). 
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lizers in the EU (and Euroland). For the US, we find a slightly lower value of 32%. This 
difference of just six percentage points is surprising in so far as automatic stabilizers in 
Europe are usually considered to be drastically higher than in the US.8 Our results qual-
ify this view to a certain degree; at least as far as proportional income shocks are con-
cerned. Figure 1 shows that taxes and social insurance contributions are the dominating 
factors which drive   in case of a uniform income shock. Benefits are of minor impor-
tance in this scenario. 
 
Figure 1: Decomposition of stabilization coefficient for both scenarios – US vs. EU 
 
 
In the case of the unemployment shock, the difference between the EU and the US is 
larger. EU automatic stabilizers now absorb 47% of the shock (49% in the Euro zone) 
whereas the stabilization effect in the US is only 34%. This difference can be explained 
with the importance of unemployment benefits which account for a large part of stabili-
zation in Europe in this scenario. Table A2 in the Appendix shows that benefits alone 
absorb 19% of the shock in Europe compared to just 7% in the US. 
Cross-country differences 
The results for the stabilization coefficient vary considerably across countries, as can be 
seen from Figure 2 (and Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix). In the case of the income 
shock, we find the highest stabilization coefficient for Denmark, where automatic stabi-
lizers cushion 56% of the shock. Belgium (53%), Germany (48%) and, surprisingly, 
                                                           
8Note that for the US the value of the stabilization coefficient for the federal income tax only is below 25% 
which is in line with the results of Auerbach and Feenberg (2000). 
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Hungary (48%) also have strong automatic stabilizers. The lowest values are found for 
Estonia (25%), Spain (28%) and Greece (29%). With the exception of France, taxes seem 
to have a stronger stabilizing role than social security contributions. 
 




In case of the unemployment shock, the stabilization coefficients are larger for the ma-
jority of countries. Again, the highest value emerges for Denmark (82%), followed by 
Sweden (68%), Germany (62%), Belgium (61%) and Luxembourg (59%). The relatively 
low value of stabilization from (unemployment) benefits in Finland compared to its 
neighboring Nordic countries might be surprising at a first glance but can be explained 
with the fact that Finland has the least generous unemployment benefits of the Nordic 
countries (see Aaberge et al. (2000)). Hungary (47%) is now at the EU average due to the 
relatively low level of unemployment benefits. At the other end of the spectrum, there 
are some countries with values below the US level of 34%. These include Estonia (23%), 
Italy (31%), and, to a lesser extent, Poland (33%). 
When looking only at the personal income tax, it is surprising that the values for the US 
(federal and state level income tax combined) are higher than the EU average. To some 
extent, this qualifies the widespread view that tax progressivity is higher in Europe 
(e.g., Alesina and Glaeser (2004) or Piketty and Saez (2007)). Of course, this can be part-
ly explained by the considerable heterogeneity within Europe. But still, only a few 
countries like Belgium, Germany and the Nordic countries have higher contributions of 
stabilization coming from the personal income tax. 
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Stabilization and Income Distribution 
Table A3 shows that in case of the proportional income shock, the stabilization coeffi-
cients are an increasing function of the income quantiles. This result is due to higher 
changes between market and disposable income for high income groups. It is worth 
mentioning that even a proportional tax would yield increasing coefficients for higher 
quantiles, i.e. progressivity of the income tax is not required for this result.  
In contrast to the increasing stabilization by income quantile for the income shock, sta-
bilization results for the unemployment shock follow a somewhat different pattern as 
demonstrated in Table A4. Here, with the exception of some Eastern and Southern Eu-
ropean countries, we find high stabilization also for the lowest income groups. As the 
unemployment shock is modeled through reweighting of our sample taking into ac-
count individual characteristics of the unemployed, a large part of the newly unem-
ployed comes from lower income quantiles. The fact that tax and transfer systems in 
countries such as Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia or Spain provide 
only weak stabilization for low income groups can be explained by rather low unem-
ployment benefits in these countries.  
What are the distributional consequences of the two macro shocks described above? 
Table A5 shows the percentage changes in the Gini coefficient and in the headcount ra-
tios for being poor or rich, all based on equivalent disposable income.9  
While the proportional income shock (IS) leads to a reduction of the Gini coefficient in 
all countries, the asymmetric unemployment shock (US) increases inequality in 15 out 
of 19 countries. In the latter case, we find a reduction of the Gini coefficient only in 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. In the case of the income shock, the 
largest reductions of the Gini coefficient occur in Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the 
UK (all >2%), the smallest ones in Greece and Slovenia (each <0.5%). In the case of the 
unemployment shock, distributional implications crucially depend on which income 
groups are hardest hit by unemployment and income losses. If low income groups are 
the first who loose their jobs during a recession, one can expect an increase in inequal-
ity. However, if also middle or upper income groups are affected which seems to be 
relevant especially in long-lasting recessions such as the current one, distributional im-
plications become more ambiguous. This ambiguity in terms of distributional effects of 
an asymmetric shock is reflected in the positive and negative signs of the Gini change.  
 Comparing the headcount ratios for both shock scenarios, we can conclude that, not 
surprisingly, in case of the unemployment shock richness is decreasing less than in the 
case of the proportional income shock.10 With the exception of Slovenia, the percentage 
reduction of rich people is substantially higher in the latter shock scenario. However, no 
such clear conclusion can be drawn considering the percentage change in poverty. In 
                                                           
9 To account for differences in family size and composition, we adjust disposable income using the OECD modified 
equivalence scale which assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to each additional adult member, and of 0.3 
to each child. 
10The reweighting approach used for modeling an increase in unemployment is implicitly based on the assumption 
that the socio-demographic characteristics of the unemployed remain constant. 
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countries such as Ireland or the United Kingdom, the asymmetric unemployment shock 
leads to a much stronger increase in the headcount for the poor than the income shock. 
However, the opposite is true for countries such as Greece, Luxembourg or the Nether-
lands. Here, distributional implications depend again crucially on which income groups 
are actually the first who become unemployed in a recession. 
“Explaining” the cross-country differences 
It is a striking feature of our results that automatic stabilizers differ significantly within 
Europe. In particular, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries 
are much weaker than in the rest of Europe. One factor contributing to this is that gov-
ernment size is often positively correlated with per capita incomes, at least in Europe. 
The stabilization of disposable incomes will therefore be higher in high income coun-
tries, just as a side effect of a larger public sector. 
But differences in automatic stabilizers across countries may also have other reasons. In 
particular, the effectiveness of demand stabilization as a way of stabilizing domestic 
output is smaller, the more open the economy. In very open economies, domestic out-
put will depend heavily on export demand and higher demand by domestic households 
will partly lead to higher imports. Clearly, openness of the economy has a number of 
other implications for the tax and transfer system, including the view that more open 
economies need more insurance against shocks as argued, e.g., by Rodrik (1998). We do 
not find that more open economies, as measured by the ratio of exports plus imports 
over GDP, have weaker automatic stabilizers, the correlation is even positive (0.57). Our 
results thus support the hypothesis of Rodrik (1998) that income stabilization is higher 
in more open economies.  
We have also analyzed the claim that countries with smaller automatic stabilizers have 
engaged in more discretionary fiscal policy action. In the debate on fiscal policy re-
sponses to the crisis, some countries have been criticized for being reluctant to enact 
fiscal stimulus programs in order to stabilize demand, in particular Germany. One reac-
tion to this criticism was to point to the fact that automatic stabilizers in Germany are 
more important than in other countries, so that less discretionary action is required. 
This raises the general question of whether countries with weaker automatic stabilizers 
have taken more discretionary fiscal policy action to compensate for this. According to 
our results, there is no correlation between fiscal stimulus programs of individual coun-
tries and stabilization coefficients.  
A further concern in the policy debate put forward by supporters of large and coordi-
nated discretionary measures was that countries could limit the size of their programs 
at the expense of countries with more generous fiscal policy responses. The central fac-
tor behind this hypothesis is the degree of openness of an economy. The more open an 
economy is, i.e. the stronger the economic ties with other countries are, the more likely 
it is that a country gains from other countries’ fiscal stimulus packages or, conversely, 
the more likely it is that own fiscal stimulus measures spill over to other countries. 
Hence, the idea behind this argument is that some countries might show a free-rider 
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behavior and profit from spill-over effects of discretionary measures.11 However, we 
find that more open countries have passed smaller stimulus programs. The same result 
holds for countries with higher budget deficits or debt levels. All in all, our results sug-
gest that policymakers did not take into account the forces of automatic stabilizers 
when designing active fiscal policy measures to tackle the current economic crisis. 
6  Conclusions and policy implications 
In this paper we have used the microsimulation models for the tax and transfer systems 
of 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM) to investigate the extent 
to which automatic stabilizers cushion household disposable income in the event of ma-
croeconomic shocks. Our simulations focus on the personal income tax, employee social 
insurance contributions and benefits. We find that the amount of automatic stabilization 
depends strongly on the type of income shock. In the case of a proportional income 
shock, approximately 38% of the shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in 
the EU. For the US, we find a value of 32%. Within the EU, there is considerable hetero-
geneity, and results range from a value of 25% for Estonia to 56% for Denmark. In gen-
eral automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries are considerably 
lower than in Continental and Northern European countries. 
In the case of an unemployment shock, which affects households asymmetrically, the 
difference between the EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers absorb 47% of 
the shock whereas the stabilization effect in the US is only 34%. Again, there is consid-
erable heterogeneity within the EU. 
Our results suggest that social protection systems, in particular the rather generous sys-
tems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for the stabilization of dis-
posable incomes and explain a large part of the difference in automatic stabilizers be-
tween Europe and the US. This is confirmed by the decomposition of stabilization ef-
fects in our analysis. In the case of the unemployment shocks, benefits alone absorb 19% 
of the shock in Europe compared to just 7% in the US, whereas the stabilizing effect of 
income taxes (taking into account State taxes in the US as well) is similar.  
Another important result of our analysis is that automatic stabilizers are very heteroge-
neous within Europe. Interestingly, Eastern and Southern European countries are char-
acterized by rather low automatic stabilizers. This is surprising, at least from an insur-
ance point of view because lower average income (and wealth) implies that households 
are more vulnerable to income shocks. One explanation for this finding could be that 
countries with lower per capita incomes tend to have smaller public sectors. From this 
perspective, weaker automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries 
are a potentially unintended side effect of the lower demand for government activity 
including redistribution. Another potential explanation, the idea that more open econ-
omies have weaker automatic stabilizers because domestic demand spills over to other 
                                                           
11 In that sense, a fiscal stimulus program can be seen as a positive externality since potential positive effects are not 
limited to the country of origin. 
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countries, seems to be inconsistent with the data, at least as far as the simple correlation 
between stabilization coefficients and trade to GDP ratios is concerned. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that countries with stronger automatic stabilizers have 
been relatively resilient during the crisis, while those with weak stabilizers have experi-
enced major economic contractions and increases in unemployment. Note however, that 
correlation does not imply causation. Hence, it is unclear whether strong automatic sta-
bilizers helped the northern EU countries coping with the crisis, or if it was the underly-
ing strength of these economies that allowed them to afford generous unemployment 
benefits, social welfare payments and the rest. Nonetheless, cutting unemployment 
benefits in countries of southern Europe, as recently suggested by the IMF, does not 
seem to be the appropriate measure to reach a balanced budget. Automatic stabilizers 
have the major advantage of providing income replacement immediately, i.e. when un-
employment starts to rise and incomes fall. While means-tested income support is gen-
erally available as a basic social security net in most EU Member States, unemployment 
insurance systems are more exclusive as they do not protect all types of workers 
equally. As the extent of unemployment risks and the ‘quality’ of social protection pro-
vided to different socio-economic groups does not coincide, one can argue that in gen-
eral those most affected are the least protected. Here, a discretionary expansion of bene-
fit generosity or easing access to benefits can play a substantial role in reaction to crises. 
However, discretionary changes to benefit systems or the creation of new benefits may 
take some time and may be more difficult to administer and deliver, in particular if new 
groups are to be integrated or new benefits created – or if fiscal restrictions are consid-
ered. 
Our results have to be interpreted in the light of various limitations of our analysis. 
Firstly, our analysis abstracts from automatic stabilization through other taxes, in par-
ticular corporate income taxes. Secondly, our analysis is purely positive and does not 
allow concluding that automatic stabilizers should be higher or lower. Increasing taxes 
and transfers would lead to higher automatic stabilizers, but economic distortions 
would also increase. Finally, we have abstracted from the role of labor supply or other 
behavioral adjustments for the impact of automatic stabilizers. We intend to pursue 
these issues in future research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Decomposition income scenario  
     FEDTax    StateTax    SIC    BEN    TaxSicBen  
Austria    0.294    0.000    0.139    0.006    0.439  
Belgium   0.382    0.000    0.131    0.014    0.527  
Denmark   0.455    0.000    0.086    0.018    0.558  
Estonia   0.228    0.000    0.021    0.004    0.253  
Finland   0.340    0.000    0.050    0.006    0.396  
France   0.153    0.000    0.181    0.036    0.370  
Germany   0.351    0.000    0.118    0.012    0.481  
Greece   0.203    0.000    0.088    0.000    0.291  
Hungary   0.307    0.000    0.160    0.009    0.476  
Ireland   0.310    0.000    0.039    0.014    0.363  
Italy   0.254    0.000    0.079    0.013    0.346  
Luxem-
bourg 
 0.265    0.000    0.097    0.012    0.374  
Nether-
lands 
 0.270    0.000    0.116    0.011    0.397  
Poland   0.168    0.000    0.118    0.015    0.301  
Portugal   0.203    0.000    0.090    0.010    0.303  
Slovenia   0.289    0.000    0.031    0.028    0.317  
Spain    0.240    0.000    0.035    0.001    0.277  
Sweden   0.368    0.000    0.040    0.012    0.420  
United 
Kingdom 
 0.267    0.000    0.054    0.031    0.352  
 EU    0.260    0.000    0.100    0.017    0.378  
EURO    0.263    0.000    0.108    0.015    0.385  
USA    0.240    0.049    0.039    -0.006    0.322  
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM 
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Table A2: Decomposition unemployment scenario 
     FEDTax    StateTax    SIC    BEN    TaxSicBen  
Austria    0.163    0.000    0.171    0.252    0.585  
Belgium   0.240    0.000    0.123    0.249    0.612  
Denmark   0.116    0.000    0.092    0.615    0.823  
Estonia   0.173    0.000    0.023    0.036    0.233  
Finland   0.221    0.000    0.049    0.248    0.519  
France   0.075    0.000    0.190    0.303    0.568  
Germany   0.209    0.000    0.145    0.269    0.624  
Greece   0.093    0.000    0.150    0.079    0.322  
Hungary   0.203    0.000    0.191    0.073    0.467  
Ireland   0.178    0.000    0.036    0.173    0.387  
Italy   0.164    0.000    0.105    0.042    0.311  
Luxem-
bourg 
 0.127    0.000    0.080    0.387    0.593  
Nether-
lands 
 0.104    0.000    0.171    0.178    0.452  
Poland   0.134    0.000    0.166    0.030    0.329  
Portugal   0.146    0.000    0.097    0.143    0.386  
Slovenia   0.152    0.000    0.221    0.073    0.431  
Spain    0.124    0.000    0.068    0.184    0.376  
Sweden   0.199    0.000    0.027    0.452    0.678  
United 
Kingdom 
 0.191    0.000    0.061    0.163    0.415  
 EU    0.156    0.000    0.124    0.188    0.469  
EURO    0.150    0.000    0.133    0.202    0.485  
USA    0.174    0.041    0.051    0.071    0.337  
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM 
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Table A3: Stabilization of income groups - Proportional Income Shock 
     TAU    Q1    Q2    Q3    Q4    Q5  
Austria    0.439    0.023    0.045    0.072    0.107    0.192  
Belgium   0.527    0.022    0.051    0.082    0.128    0.244  
Denmark   0.558    0.017    0.046    0.088    0.135    0.273  
Estonia   0.253    0.010    0.019    0.036    0.063    0.126  
Finland   0.396    0.010    0.031    0.063    0.099    0.192  
France   0.370    0.032    0.036    0.053    0.079    0.171  
Germany   0.481    0.019    0.045    0.072    0.116    0.228  
Greece   0.291    0.004    0.015    0.033    0.063    0.176  
Hungary   0.476    0.029    0.041    0.056    0.097    0.254  
Ireland   0.363    0.009    0.026    0.048    0.084    0.197  
Italy   0.346    0.010    0.035    0.051    0.077    0.173  
Luxem-
bourg 
 0.374    0.019    0.022    0.042    0.082    0.208  
Nether-
lands 
 0.397    0.020    0.040    0.062    0.093    0.182  
Poland   0.301    0.017    0.032    0.047    0.060    0.145  
Portugal   0.303    0.012    0.013    0.029    0.055    0.194  
Slovenia   0.317    0.022    0.010    0.008    0.037    0.240  
Spain    0.277    0.006    0.020    0.036    0.062    0.153  
Sweden   0.420    0.022    0.041    0.066    0.096    0.196  
United 
Kingdom 
 0.352    0.010    0.034    0.047    0.079    0.182  
 Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.   
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Table A4: Stabilization of income groups - Unemployment Shock 
     TAU    Q1    Q2    Q3    Q4    Q5  
Austria    0.585    0.111    0.094    0.069    0.130    0.181  
Belgium   0.612    0.143    0.087    0.067    0.101    0.215  
Denmark   0.823    0.095    0.189    0.166    0.196    0.177  
Estonia   0.233    0.062    0.019    0.019    0.041    0.091  
Finland   0.519    0.118    0.057    0.074    0.093    0.176  
France   0.568    0.102    0.102    0.088    0.092    0.185  
Germany   0.624    0.144    0.078    0.090    0.118    0.193  
Greece   0.322    0.016    0.031    0.040    0.071    0.164  
Hungary   0.467    0.091    0.045    0.048    0.071    0.212  
Ireland   0.387    0.101    0.049    0.044    0.061    0.132  
Italy   0.311    0.011    0.021    0.047    0.081    0.151  
Luxem-
bourg 
 0.593    0.148    0.177    0.056    0.070    0.142  
Nether-
lands 
 0.452    0.123    0.048    0.054    0.088    0.140  
Poland   0.329    0.031    0.035    0.048    0.066    0.150  
Portugal   0.386    0.014    0.005    0.040    0.075    0.252  
Slovenia   0.431    0.045    0.038    0.056    0.083    0.210  
Spain    0.376    0.038    0.049    0.065    0.076    0.148  
Sweden   0.678    0.160    0.109    0.109    0.110    0.190  
United 
Kingdom 
 0.415    0.142    0.034    0.030    0.060    0.150  











Table A5: Effect of shocks on income distribution 
 
  
     Income shock    Unemployment shock  
    Gini    Poor    Rich    Gini    Poor    Rich  
Austria    -1.297    4.760    -12.088    0.304    4.421    -3.619  
Belgium   -2.270    2.673    -16.241    0.126    3.869    -4.322  
Denmark   -2.064    3.838    -18.903    -0.218    1.176    -5.054  
Estonia   -1.622    4.529    -11.508    0.914    6.542    -2.989  
Finland   -1.806    5.622    -13.981    0.347    7.104    -3.428  
France   -1.422    7.458    -9.947    0.210    4.083    -2.409  
Germany   -1.489    4.141    -12.982    0.445    6.245    -3.469  
Greece   -0.338    7.288    -11.355    0.166    2.509    -2.820  
Hungary   -0.604    5.701    -9.241    0.518    5.612    -3.861  
Ireland   -1.335    3.701    -12.591    1.154    10.295    -7.285  
Italy   -0.735    4.910    -5.857    0.507    3.567    -2.234  
Luxem-
bourg 
 -1.233    9.994    -14.276    -0.225    1.335    -3.843  
Nether-
lands 
 -1.232    10.629    -16.256    0.652    7.892    -3.985  
Poland   -0.923    6.749    -9.692    0.281    3.757    -2.639  
Portugal   -0.611    4.693    -6.055    -0.709    1.528    -2.667  
Slovenia   -0.318    0.273    -1.290    0.327    4.354    -2.931  
Spain    -0.693    6.343    -13.806    0.590    3.545    -3.003  
Sweden   -2.050    4.215    -15.446    -0.154    3.444    -3.774  
United 
Kingdom 
 -2.219    3.753    -13.001    1.074    7.895    -2.873  
 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.     